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Abstract 
This article contributes an empirically rich account of a social enterprise project embedded in 
local urban economies of Nairobi, Kenya. The confluence of rapid, unplanned urbanization 
and economic liberalization has led to growing formations of informal settlements and a 
vibrant informal sector across post-colonial cities. These “slum” neighbourhoods, housing the 
majority of the urban population on a fraction of the city’s land, are often ignored and 
marginalized by the state and municipal authorities, particularly with regards to basic service 
provision. As a result, slum economies provide entry-points for various enterprise-led 
development schemes seeking to commercially engage both entrepreneurial individuals and 
their existing customer base in order to scale access to unmet needs. The discussion is based 
on an ethnographic study in one of Nairobi’s largest informal settlements, which focused on 
the everyday practices of a local micro-franchise called “Community Cleaning Services”. The 
article illustrates how waste workers and self-proclaimed “hustlers” were turned into micro-
franchisee entrepreneurs providing a sanitation service to residential customers, through their 
engagement with Community Cleaning Services. This ethnographic account raises two 
potentially contradictory but inter-related debates that are rarely considered alongside one 
another in the existing literature on corporate involvement in low-income markets. First, it 
reframes the critiques of enterprise-led initiatives to “poverty alleviation” by focusing on the 
implications of commercialising “basic” services and on the logistical and cultural challenges 
of turning social needs into market demands. Second, it emphasizes the often-invisible role of 
grassroots informal economies in enabling access to vital services in the absence of an 
adequately resourced and responsive municipality. The article concludes with a broader 
reflection on the effects and limitations of corporate-led development schemes targeting the 
urban poor and points to the contrasting logics of grassroots entrepreneurial urbanism and 
corporate—albeit “socially responsible”—parameters of success. 
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Highlights: 
• Corporate-led micro-franchise provides sanitation services in Nairobi ‘slums’ 
• ‘Hustlers’ of informal waste work turned into sanitation “entrepreneurs” 
• Sanitation enterprise turned ‘basic needs’ into a business opportunity  
• These corporate-community encounters are relationally constituted 
• Cultural logics of ‘slum economies’ inform contrasting economic rationalities 
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1. THE BEGINNING STARTS AT THE END 
This article contributes to the debates on corporate and social enterprise-led development, by 
investigating how a social enterprise project between a transnational corporation and informal 
sector entrepreneurs became embedded in the local urban economies of Mathare, one of the 
largest and oldest informal settlements located seven kilometres from Nairobi’s Central 
Business District. The research studied the micro-politics and social economies of social 
enterprise, “Community Cleaning Services” (CCS) over the course of 15 months of fieldwork 
between 2009 and 2012. CCS was originally created as a micro-franchise in 2005 to serve as 
a conduit for working with local youth living in Nairobi slums engaged in garbage collection, 
recycling, and urban farming. Co-founded and sponsored by an American transnational 
company (hereafter the Company), the story of CCS and its peculiar alliance with the 
Company reveals the complexities of a commercial partnership between seemingly disparate 
organizational entities. The article investigates and unpacks the social relationships and 
dynamics of this partnership whose beginnings and credibility were inextricably linked to two 
separate and seemingly insurmountable problems associated with urban poverty: youth 
underemployment and inadequate sanitation infrastructure.  
 
This article focuses on how self-proclaimed “hustlers” engaged in waste work “in the hood” 
were turned into micro-franchise entrepreneurs of a sanitation social business. The 
ethnographic account of this corporate-slum encounter therefore offers a series of 
contributions to urban, economic, and development geography. Most notably, this article 
contributes to recent scholarship interrogating the “entrepreneurial developmentalism” of 
corporate-led social enterprises that romanticise and repurpose the self-employed poor into 
“enterprising subjects” (Dolan & Johnstone Louis 2011, 30; Cross 2014). The intention is not 
to dismiss the corporate engagement outright, but instead to offer meaningful methodological 
and empirical insights on the convergence of two seemingly irreconcilable economic logics at 
play: those of corporate capitalism and those of informal economies. The aim is to focus on 
how a corporate-led project and its social enterprise parameters for success were shaped and 
re-configured by the “hustle economy” (Author 2013) of an informal settlement, and how 
particular aspects of the corporate presence, in turn, marked local practices of ‘hustling’.  
 
At a time when market-based approaches to assorted development challenges have multiplied 
in the 21st century, there is a dearth of geographical scholarship examining the political 
economies of social business ventures, in part because of the difficulties around gaining long-
term and multi-sited research access to the project fields spanning the boardroom and 
grassroots, as well as the methodologically and ethically challenging research process 
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requiring shifting roles from participant observer to observing participant (Welker 2009; 
Holmes and Marcus 2005; Mosse 2005; Cross 2014). Through seeking to establish trust and 
an ethnographic foothold in both the corporate and the informal life worlds (Holmes and 
Marcus 2005), the methodology of this research included being both a participant observer in 
the business meetings of the social enterprise as well as an observing participant in the 
sanitation service operations of slum-based youth groups.  
 
The article is structured in three sections. First, the theoretical section summarises the key 
debate concerning the role of the private sector in development, and provides background 
context to Nairobi’s political economy of slums, urban sanitation inequality, youth and 
informal economies. Second, the empirical section summarises the different stages of the 
corporate-community encounter, highlighting the complexities of the hustle economy 
amongst youth involved in waste work and the micro-politics of sanitation in their 
neighbourhoods. The last analytical section investigates the effects of this encounter on both 
youth job creation and improved sanitation, arguing that abstract conceptions of business, 
market demand and entrepreneurship were perceived, articulated, and experienced differently 
by different actors in everyday lived practice. The article argues that the particular social and 
economic rationalities and coping strategies shaped by youth income precarity and sanitation 
poverty did not necessarily match the imagined outcomes of a corporation seeking to improve 
lives. The aim, therefore, is to conceptualise the corporate-slum encounter, by reflecting 
critically but empathetically on the respective assumptions, norms, and parameters of both a 
corporation adapting to local informal economies and infrastructures, and the self-proclaimed 
‘hustlers’ who are pro-business, but whose social and economic organisation ‘in the hood’ 
challenges the foundational logic of corporate capitalism where success is tied to sustained 
growth and profit, and where notions of entrepreneurship presume the pursuit for 
individualistic and continued economic gain.  
 
 
2. Engaging the (Hustle) Economies of Slum Worlds 
The “geographies of marketization” have positioned markets as the dominant institution of 
modernity, across the formal/informal sector divide (Boeckler and Bernt 2012). The 
corporation, one of the dominant protagonists of 20st century global capitalism (Paine 2004) 
and co-producer of dominant business knowledge (Olds and Thrift 2005), has become an 
opportunistic agent of development (Cross and Street 2009) in the 21st century as market-
based approaches to development have mainstreamed claims to poverty alleviation, access to 
basic needs, and partnership with the entrepreneurial poor. These claims and subsequent 
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practices vary widely across industries and geographies, simultaneously demonized and 
venerated. Some regard these interventions as void of moral agency (Korten 2001; Welker 
2009), others hail them as the most efficient option for delivering on the promises of 
globalisation including the advancement of social and environmental causes (Hammond el al 
2007; Hart and Prahalad 2002; Kandachar and Halme 2008). More recent critiques have 
stayed away from the moral and ethical debates, instead suggesting that appending 
development claims to social business ventures is both highly unrealistic and questionable 
business strategy. The provocative argument here is that new business development is 
challenging enough in low-income markets with highly informal structures, so businesses 
should stick to their fundamental competencies of growth through sustained increase of 
supply and demand, rather than hope to address the multi-dimensionality of poverty through 
enterprise (Simanis 2012). Across the claims and counter-claims of market-led approaches to 
development including Corporate Social Responsibility, Base of the Pyramid, Markets for the 
Poor, and more recently “Creative Shared Value,” to mention the most common idioms, lie 
under-explored grounds for geographical inquiry concerning how these increasingly 
mainstream discourses are put into practice, funded, justified, and contested in rapidly 
growing cities, and how they interface with informal economies in contexts of unplanned 
urbanisation.  
 
Two sets of recent literatures focused on the role of corporations in development are 
ideologically opposed: One rooted in business and management scholarship celebrates the 
emancipatory potential of corporate-led development and Base of the Pyramid strategies, 
while the other, including a growing literature on the anthropology of corporations, 
interrogates the implications of corporate-led development particularly on vulnerable 
communities. A more nuanced account of the vicissitudes and dynamics of urban informality 
in everyday lived practice and its encounters with corporate practices must engage both sides 
of the business and development debate spectrum in order to reflect meaningfully on the 
challenges, limitations as well as possibilities of market-led approaches to development. 
Therefore, the empirical context of this article dialogues with both of these literatures, as well 
as building on the informal economy literature in order to conceptualise the leitmotiv of key 
informants, whose conception of business was inextricably tied to “hustling”. In Nairobi, the 
‘hustle’ has become integral to the “creolized argot” (Comaroff & Comaroff 2005) of youth 
living and working in informal settlements (known as “slums” to most in the city, or the 
“ghetto” to urban youth referring to their neighbourhoods), and this expression epitomises the 
under-documented and complex social fabric and everyday logics of life in the slums.  
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An estimated 4-5 million people live in Nairobi, with over 60 % of the city’s inhabitants 
living in slums (Huchzermeyer 2011, 3). This jarring statistic reflects the global trends of 
rapid urbanisation in the 21st century, with one in seven people living in informal human 
settlements (UN-Habitat 2003; UN-Habitat 2010; Davis 2006; Sattherthwaite 2007). Across 
mainstream representations of slums, the social and economic modes of organizing, 
exchanging, sharing, co-habiting, and learning are not only largely and uncritically 
categorized as “informal”, they are usually defined by what they are not (Roitman 1990). This 
is especially the case with narratives of urban poverty in African slums (Mbembe and Nuttall 
2004; Ferguson 2006; Myers 2005). As a result, the lives of the marginalized but majority 
city-dwellers go undocumented or are reduced to essentialized narratives of either deprivation 
and entrapment, or romanticised entrepreneurialism. Yet, as informal economies absorb and 
generate diverse (albeit tenuous) income opportunities amongst a growing urban labour force, 
unlike normative assumptions that the informal sector is a transient state of economic 
liminality moving towards the formal market economy, informality is actually growing and 
becoming the norm in today’s global economy (Myers 2011; Roy and Alsayyad 2004; urban 
informality is growing (Neurwirth 2012).  
 
Scholars across economic anthropology, micro-economics and development have since the 
early 1970’s studied and sought to theorise the “economies of the poor”. Starting with Keith 
Hart’s seminal research in urban Ghana, research conceptualising “informal economies” 
demonstrates the logic of diversifying income opportunities and risk in conditions of rising 
unemployment and diminishing state welfare in post-colonial cities (Hart 1973; Potts 2008; 
Skinner 2008). Influencing the justifications for bottom-up approaches to development, 
scholars focused on development practice concerned with the multi-dimensionality of poverty 
and well-being through the lens of “livelihood strategies” (Chambers 1995; Chant 2009), to 
examine the ways in which people’s diverse activities, capabilities and assets (stores, 
resources, claims and access) are mobilized and pursued. Using economists’ frames of 
reference to articulate what the poor have, Moser (1998) suggests that an “asset vulnerability 
framework” points to the “tangible and intangible assets” of the poor, who are in effect 
“managers of complex asset portfolios.” Similarly, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) refer to the 
poor as “barefoot hedge-fund managers” and emphasize the high degrees of risk involved in 
“poor economics” and their 100% liability, unlike their white-collar counterparts whose 
occupations are high-risk but who enjoy limited liability. And finally, a detailed study of 
“how the world’s poor live on two dollars a day” (Collins et al. 2009) uses financial diaries in 
villages and urban slums across Bangladesh, India and South Africa to document the careful 
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attention, financial literacy and frugality that goes into everyday earnings, spending, and 
saving patterns of poor households.  
 
Read together, these studies capture meaningful though often piece-meal aspects of everyday 
economic survival demonstrating that being income-poor does not equate lack of planning, 
but rather requires continuous sophisticated calculations of risk and adaptation to uneven 
development and the absence of state or other public welfare. Yet, what is often less explicitly 
articulated in the literature expressing disaffection from the Left in the face of seemingly 
unstoppable neoliberal capitalism and “privatization of everything” (Watts 1994) is that 
informal economies re-appropriate capitalist relations, using market means to deliver products 
and services to customers in their own communities in contexts where state welfare, basic 
services, and public institutions are often absent or unevenly distributed (Fontaine 2008; 
Neurwirth 2012). One of the effects of economic liberalization policies has been the increased 
absence of public services for the city’s majority living in material poverty (Chaplin 2011; 
Ferguson 2006; Huchzermeyer 2010). This absence has fostered entire informal economies 
capitalizing on the gap left by the state and the available workforce, to carve out alternative 
sources of work (King 1996). Forms of privatization of public services ‘from below’ have 
emerged especially in sanitation, water, and waste services (McFarlane 2011; Gill 2010; 
Moore 2009; Author 2013; Fredericks 2009).  
 
Gidwani’s work in Capital Interrupted (2009) is of particular theoretical relevance here, as 
his ethnographic study of the effects of a large surface irrigation scheme in Central Gujarat on 
agrarian development seeks to re-orient the discussion towards a broader interrogation of 
established narratives of capitalism. Euro-centric and neo-classical theories of capitalist 
accumulation and labour relations do not adequately represent the realities of agrarian 
capitalism in Gidwani’s fieldsite. He points to other “cultural logics” and micro-politics of 
work to examine the contingent constructions and assemblages of economic relations. It is in 
this sense that this article points to the cultural logics of youth operating within the urban 
informal economy, and the alternative parameters, norms, and interpretations of work of these 
situated informal economies. 
 
In the African urban context, youth (particularly male) experience prolonged transitions to 
culturally contingent norms of adulthood, and comprise the majority of the informal labour 
force (Yaqub 2009; Jeffrey 2010; Honwana & De Boeck 2005; Chant 2009; Hamilton and 
Hamilton 2009; Author 2013). The informal sector has grown due to job losses incurred in the 
wake of neoliberal economic policies, as an entire generation of young people has never had 
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jobs to lose. In such a context, youth are perceived as socially and politically vulnerable, a 
“potential category of exclusion and exploitation” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2005, 22) but 
whose status of liminality, marginality and “trouble” (Butler 1990) becomes a generative 
space of opportunism. Youth move fluidly and sometimes inconspicuously between illicit and 
licit ways of making a living, finding their own “ways and means” which sometimes “involve 
the supply of hitherto unimagined ‘services,’” that may involve illicit or stigmatised forms of 
work blurring the lines of legality/illegality in the absence of formal employment 
opportunities (Comaroff & Comaroff 2005, 23). Hence, youth are left to their own devices, to 
“create their own social worlds” (ibid.) and shape alternative economies that both reject 
formal institutions of authority while maintaining “multiple interconnections” and 
continuously negotiating political and economic arrangements.   
 
The ‘hustle’ is an expression of capitalist relations, but performed and exercised in ways that 
defy central assumptions of capitalism related to particular pursuits of profit, growth, and 
“rational” economic decisions. “Making a living” (Chant 2009) for youth ‘hustling’ in 
Mathare included a portfolio of income generating activities and livelihood strategies that 
were entangled with everyday street practices of “hanging about” (Jones 2012). Often 
misunderstood, youth elicit polarized narratives (Comaroff & Comaroff 2005, 20) that mirror 
the competing discourses of the “slum city” as an lawless ghetto on the one extreme (Davis 
2006; Angotti 2005) and a site of creative coping strategies and “generative spaces” at the 
other (Simone 2010).  
 
In the absence of formal institutional support, chances of survival and success are predicated 
on “webs of exchange” with other “ghetto bound individuals” (Venkatesh 2006, 95; 103-104). 
In Nairobi slums, youth operate on the periphery of legal and formal employment, their webs 
and networks anchored in friendship and place-based youth collectives. These “youth 
groups,” describing their everyday circumstances and work under the idiom of ‘hustling’, 
have taken on waste work to strategically modulate between survivalism, livelihood strategy, 
and contestations of authority, striking a tenuous balance between feeding themselves and 
renegotiating their place within the city (Author 2013). Rather than the endless pursuit of 
economic profit, the everyday goals are to remain anchored in their commercial relations, 
constantly realigning their businesses to fit the demands and shifting economies of their 
neighbourhoods (Venkatesh 2006). These constant shifts and adjustments reflect the 
unregulated nature of informal economic structures, and are part of the “cultural logics of 
work” (Gidwani 2001, 2008) based on constant adaptation and improvisation. These “hustle 
economies” generate processes of interstitial learning in the streets, and shape “generative 
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spaces of experimentation” for youth (Chant 2009; Hart 1973; Moser 1998; Saunders 2010; 
McFarlane 2011). These ‘hustlers’ appropriate and commercialise particular corners, goods, 
and services as and when they can, often only able to capture the least desirable opportunities, 
such as dealing with garbage and, in the case of this research, shared toilets. The following 
section describes how a corporation sought to build on (rather than displace) these existing 
youth-led waste micro-enterprises to create a new local market for cleaning products whilst 
delivering positive social outcomes in low-income neighbourhoods including job creation, 
and safer, cleaner toilets.  
 
 
3. THE CCS STORY 
3.1. The Company 
Founded in the late 19th century, the Company is an American family owned and run 
consumer-packaged-goods company. Sustainability has been a core part of the Company's 
ethos, reflected in its various efforts to reduce the environmental footprint of its operations 
even before regulations were imposed on industry, and to invest in greening its manufacturing 
processes through renewable energy sources. Curious about the Base of the Pyramid (BoP) 
thesis, in 2005 the Company began to widen its commitment to sustainability by focusing on 
poverty alleviation through enterprise models and became one of the first corporate pioneers 
of BoP incubation.  
 
The Company’s East African subsidiary was established in 1968, five years following 
Kenya’s independence. As a leading provider of insecticide products, the Company had 
become the world’s largest buyer of Kenyan Pyrethrum, a natural insecticide grown in the 
fertile Kenyan highlands. In the 1980’s and early 1990’s, the Company was best known to 
Kenyans for selling locally manufactured mosquito coils, special because they were sold 
individually for 2 KSH (0.023 USD), and called Mwanainchi (“common man”). In the late 
1990’s, the mosquito coil packaging started shifting its product image and name to a more 
global brand, and in 2004 the Company’s Kenyan factory was closed down. Today, while the 
Company products are available on the shelves of Kenyan supermarkets, they have lost 
considerable market share to other corporate competitors. 1 Furthermore, retailers in lower 
income neighbourhoods cannot afford most of the Company’s cleaning products, and at best 
stock a few of the aerosol insecticide. Ironically, a few years after the “common man” 
mosquito coil and local production facility were strategically removed from the Kenyan 
market, the Company would sponsor a BoP project in Kenya to identify potential business 
                                                
1 Semi-structured interviews conduced in July 2010 with former COMPANY Kenya employees who 
had worked with the Company from 1992-2003.  
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innovation opportunities working with and in low-income communities.  
 
3.2. Leading up to CCS 
In 2005, the Company sponsored a Kenya-based test of a business development methodology 
called the Base of the Pyramid Protocol™, developed to facilitate corporate engagements 
with low-income communities to “co-create businesses of mutual value” (Simanis et al 2008). 
Sponsoring the BoP Protocol™ pilot marked the beginning of a long-term commitment to 
explore innovative ways to deliver the benefits of the Company products—from insecticides 
to “home cleaning” products—to previously unfamiliar low-income markets, recognising the 
need to rethink business potential in communities formally considered charity cases or causes 
for humanitarian aid (Author and DeKoszmovszky 2012). The venture started out as an 
applied academic project, and eventually focused on Nairobi’s low-income urban  
communities, as a business innovation initiative.  
 
From the Company’s point of view, operating in such a different environment meant 
accepting and working with ‘partners’ who had little formal business training. Recollecting 
the challenges of taking this kind of risk, former VP of Developing Markets noted, 
 
We were working with young people who had very little capital and 
knowledge about how to start new businesses. In many cases at the Base of 
the Pyramid people don’t even have a rule of law to be able to control their 
assets or their money or be able to own property.2 
 
For any company, this posed a considerable challenge not least because of how difficult it 
would be to track, document, and monitor operations. And yet the conscious decision to by-
pass formal institutional channels, including government, and engage directly with young 
people in the slums afforded the Company a certain license to start somewhere. What the 
business would ultimately become was unexpected. 
 
In 2007, following months of what was referred to as a “test small, fail small and learn big” 
experimental phase resembling a more standard Avon ladies model of door-to-door home 
pesticide control service, some of the youth engaged in the process turned their attention 
away from private services to the ill-maintained community-based public toilets. In Nairobi, 
due to the shortage of toilet coverage in all public spaces subject to rapid and unplanned 
urbanisation, toilets have become a business and tool of political opportunism, often fuelling 
                                                
2 Interview conducted and recorded at corporate headquarters, May 2010.  
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the stigmas and “bads” (Beck 1992) associated with slums, including inadequate sanitation 
(Chiuri 1978). Yet for a company seeking “BoP business innovation”, these poorly 
maintained and managed community resources fit “triple bottom line” values, overlapping 
commercial, environmental, and social objectives (Robbins 2006). Toilets were at once the 
site of potential income for youth waste workers, a potential source of revenue and product 
placement for the Company, and a potential preventive healthcare offering through improved 
sanitation conditions. So, moving away definitively from the first experiment, the focus of the 
BoP project turned to developing a shared-toilet cleaning business. The micro-franchise 
Community Cleaning Services was thus co-founded by the Company’s American 
Sustainability Manager (SM), hired in 2006 in part to lead BoP efforts, and the Company’s 
former Kenyan Marketing Manager, CCS’ new Manager, to provide an entrepreneurial 
sanitation service-model to slum residents. 
 
While daily CCS operations were handled by the local CCS Central team (headed by the CCS 
Manager, the only person not from a slum neighbourhood), weekly phone updates and 
quarterly field visits were part of the Company SM’s involvement, as was a delicate balance 
between considering the challenges of new business development in volatile and 
unpredictable economies, and considering the unyielding demands and parameters of a multi-
national company. Everyday operational decisions were made on-site by the CCS Manager, 
while broader strategic decisions including how to identify potential entrepreneurs, cost 
structures, team training procedures, and product delivery logistics were made between the 
Company’s SM and the CCS Manager, who referred to each other as “my business partner”. 
While the SM was attuned to local economic realities, had considerable field experience 
(including basic Swahili skills) and knew most entrepreneurs by name, the nuances of 
everyday practices amongst local CCS teams were not perceptible from afar. And yet, as the 
next section describes, these nuances were inextricably linked to the reasons why CCS would 
ultimately have difficulty scaling its operations, and why its impact was difficult to measure 
and quantify.  
 
By 2008, CCS operated daily, selling and delivering cleaning services to shared residential 
toilets accessed by several families, schools, clinics, restaurants, and bars. One of the 
Company’s Research and Development employees had identified the optimal existing 
formulas of the Company’s cleaning products that would prove effective in Nairobi’s ‘slum 
toilets’ infrastructures. These were imported to Kenya from the Company’s Egypt facility in 
barrels, not cases of consumer packaging. Bulk importation was an important business 
adaptation for the CCS service model because it “closed the loop” on packaging waste within 
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the CCS business, allowing re-use of all packaging—locally sourced repurposed 20 litre jerry 
cans—reducing CCS’ environmental impact and service cost.  
 
In 2009, CCS was working with over 20 independent entrepreneurs and over one hundred 
public toilets, establishing a presence in most of Nairobi’s low-income communities. Overall, 
the business development phase of CCS between 2007 to the end of 2009 aimed to provide a 
platform for iterative experimentation (“business innovation”) and test the feasibility of the 
business model. In practice, this phase put in sharp relief the friction as well as 
complementarity of different corporate and community economic logics, parameters and 
norms. 
 
3.3. Embedding CCS  
3.3.1. Understanding everyday cultural logics of “entrepreneurs” 
CCS had identified potential entrepreneurs in 2007 with the help of a local NGO with ties to 
local youth groups whose associations were systematically tied to childhood friendships, 
football team allegiances, and their local sub-neighbourhood (“the base”).  For youth on the 
fringe of the urban economy and entrepreneurial in spirit, waste work had become a kind of 
urban rite of passage in the slums, known as Taka Ni Pato (Trash is Cash). These Taka Ni 
Pato networks became logical partners for a social business venture focused on urban 
sanitation. 
 
Youth groups provided entry-points, but an ‘entrepreneur’ or contact person within the group 
was then identified and made responsible for selecting a team. At first, most of these teams 
were composed of 6 to 12 individuals. Initially the entire youth group seemed interested in 
CCS. They saw uniforms, cleaning equipment, and a “sponsor”. Soon after, many members 
were discouraged that CCS involved hard physical work, door-to-door sales, and meagre 
earnings—a small initial customer base meant that there were not enough cleaning jobs to 
justify large teams. Once the novelty of working with an outside sponsor faded, the 
disinterested left. “They realized that there was more to this work than just getting a free 
uniform.”3  
 
For the cleaning teams, CCS work started with early morning meetings at the youth group 
“base” to assemble, uniform and equipment in hand, and conduct deliberate pedestrian 
marketing, walking through the slum at peak rush hour to the first toilet stall.  
 
                                                
3 Interview with CCS member, October 2009. 
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Many of these toilets are not well connected to the sewer line, and because of the 
big number of people using them daily, we have that problem of clogging. It is 
common to find that there are ten plots [homes] using two toilets, with an average 
of five people in each plot, so you can imagine the mess they’re in.  After we 
clean every part of the toilet, scrub the walls and the floors - every corner, we 
then use the product to disinfect. Then we add the gel. That is how we clean. 4 
 
That would be considered “one job”. Because toilets were shared, so was the cost of the 
service, usually between 250 and 350 KSH (3-4 USD), an average of 30 KSH (0.34 USD) 
“per door” of households whose monthly rent ranged between 1,000 and 3,000 KES (11-34 
USD). A CCS job usually involved between two to four cleaners, and each “job” could take 
between 20 and 40 minutes. Whatever the earnings were, the team split the amount equally, 
and if the lead entrepreneur wasn’t present, he or she would get a ‘finder’s fee’ but the 
majority of the earnings went to those who actually cleaned. Completely four to six “jobs” 
was considered a good day.  
 
Although it was deemed easier to deal with one micro-franchisee per area, in practice the unit 
of the micro-franchisee was the group rather than a single individual. Initially it was hoped 
that individual entrepreneurs would themselves manage multiple cleaning teams (and hence, 
scale the micro-franchise). Informed by Western conceptions of entrepreneurship, the 
Company had encouraged CCS to target “self-interested entrepreneurs” (Dolan and Rajak 
2011) who were dually motivated by prospects of an additional business opportunity, and by 
bringing the “social benefit” of the cleaning service. Yet, individuals who would prove to be 
capable “self-interested entrepreneurs” were not necessarily “team players” nor considerate of 
community interests. For instance, one such entrepreneur nick-named Ben Clean was initially 
lauded for his ability to grow his enterprise, but was eventually asked to leave CCS in 2009 
when it was rumoured that he was using acid to “make the bowl as white looking as possible” 
while not providing protective gloves for his cleaners.  
 
In contrast to Ben Clean, most CCS entrepreneurs were accountable to and part of a youth 
group collective. So in practice, the cleaning work and customer relations, operational 
decisions, and even cash management were shared or rotational responsibilities amongst a 
smaller unit within the youth group. Consequently, by late 2009, the nomenclature within the 
Company and CCS Central officially shifted from “entrepreneurs” to “mobile cleaning 
teams” (MCTs), which had paradoxical effects. On the one hand, promoting a more 
                                                
4 Interview conducted in Kawangware, Nairobi, with CCS “Quality Assurance Professional”, May 
2010. 
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egalitarian and less hierarchical structure meant that if the so-called entrepreneur faulted for 
whatever reason, another team member could take the reigns and keep operations going. On 
the other hand, managing teams meant having to acknowledge group micro-politics.  
 
Most teams had specific days for CCS work. Mathare Number Ten Youth Group 
(MANYGRO) had a landlord for whom they cleaned daily, but most other CCS teams had 
weekly clients, and a few monthly clients including primary schools. The likelihood of 
accessing water was higher in the earliest part of the day, so jobs were often completed after 
dawn, and during dry season when water was predicted to be scarce, the teams ensured to fill 
(and guard) enough 20 litre jerry-cans of water the night prior, and rented the CCS handcart 
to transport them around. The end of a CCS workday could be at 10 a.m., noon, or 2 p.m. But 
it was rarely the end of the workday. Before the team disbanded, if the group felt rich that 
day, they might buy a cup of “chai” (tea) and a “chapati” (flat bread) from a local street-food 
vendor. That was often the first meal of the day, and usually the last until suppertime.  
 
CCS youth could spend hours after their day’s work hanging around their base in their CCS 
uniform, a sort of de-facto marketing statement that became part of a performed “face to face” 
kind of capitalism (Jeffrey 2010) where corporeal presentation, movement and style, afforded 
the MCTs a degree of improvisation and interpretation that mere products and their packaging 
narrative could not have. In their professionalizing function, the uniforms afforded MCTs not 
only the legitimacy to enter semi-private compounds, schools and elite spaces such as the 
local Chief’s compound, but also gave specific meaning to the moments of kuzurura 
(loitering) that provided a public sign-post implying, “I may be idling right now, but I had a 
job today”. The various meanings and moments of uniform display illustrated how CCS’ 
branding was locally appropriated, a highly “embodied” work practice (Gidwani 2001) that 
was incorporated into the subjectivities and performance of the “hustler”. As they circulated 
the neighbourhood to come in and out of semi-private spaces to clean, they moved from one 
public space to another as branded pedestrian “sales people”, “professionalizing” the hustle 
economy of waste work and rendering “dirty work” more visible and acceptable. 
 
Some MCTs created a separate CCS account to keep track of earnings, even if part of CCS 
revenues were re-invested in other youth group activities. Each team handled this “weeding 
out” process differently, but systematically most CCS MCTs ended up being a four to six 
person collective, anchored within a broader youth group of approximately 25-30 members. 
As a result of this internal fissure, practices of kuzurura involved two contrasting though 
adjacent rhythms: youth who were working at a particular time, and their other mates who 
 14 
were hanging out—those on the "job" adjacent to the "jobless corner". The jobless corner 
provided a social entourage, and served as a source of protection in the face of potential 
harassment from police, other youth gangs, or the disapproving remarks of overbearing wazee 
watiaji (“elders on our backs”).  
 
3.3.2. Economic rationalities in ‘the hood’ 
Since 2007, MANYGRO’s CCS team had identified the lack of community toilets in their 
community and targeted two kinds of customers. They marketed CCS to households that had 
access to a shared residential toilet (trained and encouraged by CCS Central to do so). They 
also negotiated with the landlord of a residential plot in a central area of their neighbourhood 
to construct a “community toilet” in 2006. The agreement was that MANYGRO would 
manage running and operations of the toilet at a pay-per-use cost of 2 KSH or 150 KES (1.68 
USD) per month per household. In exchange, MANYGRO paid the landlord 700 KSH (7.83 
USD) a month, and agreed to take on any repairs or additional costs including water. This 
toilet had significant local meaning, serving thousands of residents who otherwise lacked 
access to a shared facility. The CCS team cleaned it every morning and after a while, most 
neighbouring shack-dwellers, whose landlords had consistently refused to provide shared 
toilet facilities in the residential compound, accessed the MANYGRO toilet for a monthly 
fee. In 2011, MANYGRO added to the community toilet’s offering (and revenue potential) 
when they re-routed a water point so the toilet had near-by access to water, adding significant 
value and foot traffic to the MANYGRO “base”. 
 
Between August 2009 and April 2010, MANYGRO’s CCS sales—number of toilets cleaned 
and product used—remained relatively consistent but stagnant throughout the months. They 
sought out customers within their existing garbage collection customer base—residents with 
whom they had developed trusted relationships over the years. The leitmotif explanation for 
lack of growth was, “it’s difficult to market CCS because so many people say they appreciate 
the end result but cannot afford to pay for it regularly.” But as the following section shows, 
the challenge was not only the (un)willingness or (in)ability to pay. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the challenge of scaling CCS was that even those who seemed most 
active in CCS work still held onto their other sources of income, which formed an expanding 
portfolio of income generating activities including garbage collection, plastics recycling, and 
urban farming. For MANYGRO, CCS provided the seed capital for their urban farming 
business, and important access to business training and regular visits from CCS field officers, 
affording MANYGRO a certain status of recognition and influence in the community as a 
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youth group capable of eliciting external sources of attention and support including NGOs 
and the Company. This risk diversification depended on logics of solidarity but was also 
subject to peer pressure amongst group members whose allegiance and sense of place was 
highly situated. Both the territorial sensibilities of the groups who were economically bound 
to their “base”, and the individual social cost of doing “too well” posed real psychological 
limits to individual economic gain, regularly manifest as strategic discretion concerning 
personal income and an implicit resistance to scaling up the portfolio (Author 2013). Each 
enterprise stayed strategically small in scale, and profits from one were used as seed capital to 
invest in another, allowing the diversified portfolio to expand laterally. Consciously hiding 
and subconsciously limiting one’s income was a protective mechanism against the risk of 
becoming a target for crime, being exploited by friends and family and subject to social 
exclusion. 
 
So, MANYGRO CCS sales numbers indicated a tendency to maintain a limited number of 
regular customers and focus especially on the “daily clean” of the community toilet. They 
were not trying to grow their CCS business, and certainly did not venture out beyond their 
informally marked economic zone of existing residential garbage collection customers (see 
Figure 2). This raised the following paradox. They admitted that,   
 
Unlike with garbage collection where you get paid once a month and the 
income doesn’t change since you have a set number of plots each month, with 
CCS you get paid each time you clean, and the income and customers have 
potential to continuously grow.5 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
And yet, to MANYGRO the importance was retaining a set number of customers.  Whilst 
they participated in CCS Quarterly General Meetings where the “market potential” of 
tenement buildings in each CCS customer base was discussed at length amongst the MCTs, in 
practice MANYGRO were more committed to sustaining a constant, albeit small-scale 
venture.  
 
In contrast, one of the CCS entrepreneurs locally known as Mzee Kijana (young elder) who 
worked as a sole entrepreneur, had little ability to retain “repeat” customers and instead 
focused continuously on seeking out new customers beyond his immediate residential 
periphery. Mzee Kijana belonged only loosely to a youth group and was not involved in the 
                                                
5 Focus group discussion, Mathare 10, January 2010. 
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garbage economy, or its associated economic or relationally constituted territorial zoning. He 
was the only ‘non-youth’ CCS member (in his late 40’s), and preferred to work alone, hiring 
cleaners he trained personally on a case-by-case basis. MANYGRO and Mzee Kijana’s 
approaches and impact contrasted: a small sustained set of repeat customers versus the 
continuous expansion of a one-off customer base. As these two examples show, CCS 
members and their life histories challenged the deceptively homogenizing qualifier ‘micro-
franchisee’ or even ‘entrepreneur.’ Despite efforts to standardize operations, no two CCS 
teams would ever be the same, act the same, work the same, nor would the value of CCS 
work acquire the same meaning to any two “hustlers”. The notion of a ‘job’ in the hustle 
economy was often spoken about in similar terms but lived in different forms from one 
‘hustler’ to the next.  
  
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
4.  CONCEPTUALISING IMPACT WITHOUT GROWTH 
4.1. Turning hustlers into entrepreneurs 
The incremental growth of the business, “one toilet a day”, was to many CCS respondents a 
source of pride in a context otherwise marked by expected and frequent setbacks. This 
contentment in incremental improvements, akin to the “politics of patience” (Appadurai 
 2001) of other community-led slum upgrading efforts, would inevitably clash with a 
corporation’s temporal expectation and vision of change. To the Company, “incremental 
change” meant stagnant growth, and equated its investment to loss. Conversely, CCS’ 
Manager understood (and relied upon) the reality that change and gaining communities’ trust 
took time, that “trust has to be earned and cannot be forced.”6 But to the Company’s 
Sustainability Manager, “patient capital” and social investment had a rapidly approaching 
expiration date after six years. CCS’ Manager was aware of this and received considerable 
pressure from his business partner to produce more data from the field to justify the 
investment if only for “business innovation learning” purposes, yet did not express the same 
sense of alarm when faced with CCS’ “P&L” (profit and loss). This tension was reflected in 
the weekly CCS meetings between 2009 and 2010, which simultaneously offered moments of 
ephemeral celebration concerning positive field-anecdotes, followed by deflated enthusiasm 
when the “numbers” of that month were disclosed. At best, MCT sales had plateaued 
throughout that year. While business concerns were raised about CCS’ inability to scale, my 
ethnographic research revealed that youth perceived a limit to the desirability of growth and 
the risks of doing “too well” (Author 2013).   
                                                
6 Interview in Huruma with Mzee Kijana, July 14th, 2010 
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To the Taka Ni Pato ‘hustlers,’ for whom income activities were diversified into a waste work 
portfolio, CCS meant job creation for youth equated with two key values: “earning an honest 
living” and “building trust” with customers. According to one of the first CCS team leaders 
who had an active role as a youth mentor and football coach, opting for an “honest living” 
meant making a choice between potentially higher gains from criminal activity, (despite high 
risk of gang in-fighting and conflict with the police), and working hard for a small wage. CCS 
faced the following paradox: It offered more lucrative work than casual labour in the 
industrial area, with a fair payment structure, in-field training and a strong social support 
system. However, in fostering self-employment around an un-established service, each team 
was responsible for marketing, customer relations, and recruiting new members. This made it 
much more laborious than the alternative income generating activities in the ‘hood’ that had 
become well-established businesses (garbage collection, second hand sales, recycling) and 
less lucrative than petty criminal activity, or just relying on NGO projects engaging youth as 
foot soldiers, often jokingly referred to as “feeding programmes”. 
 
Trust was critical and yet difficult to ground in concrete terms, as consistent with the 
informality of social and economic relations. No CCS contracts existed and any attempt to 
draft official contractual agreements might have put off most of the ‘hustlers’ whose work 
always retained a degree of strategic discretion. The notion of trust was continuously evoked 
in relation to cash management, customer relations, inter-team dynamics, and between CCS 
entrepreneurs and CCS Central. The issue of cash management in particular reflected the 
tension between self-interested individualistic behaviour and group interests.  
 
Striving for an honest living and earning trust of customers and peers alike were ideals that 
could not be granted with permanency in a context where survivalism and unforeseen 
circumstances often created lapses of solidarity and group ethics. So while both “earning an 
honest living” and “building trust” were laudable and oft expressed goals in normative 
rhetoric, in practice they were both entangled with the messier reality of the mtaa (“hood”) 
where constant risk calculation and opportunism in the face of everyday adversity blur the 
line between licit and illicit work. 
 
CCS wasn’t meant as a temporary band-aid to urban poverty or to just target a phase of 
youthhood in a tokenistic fashion. Many individuals within CCS had grown with it since 
2006, going from team cleaners to team leaders to hired staff or “mentors” of other teams. 
Both the Company’s SM and CCS Manager agreed that all CCS personnel needed the same 
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“street credibility” and knowledge of “codes of the streets” as any savvy “ghetto-based” 
entrepreneurial youth in order to relate to, let alone manage teams.  
 
Often as businesses grow, they start needing people with bachelor or even 
master degrees, bringing people from outside. This is what makes us unique, 
as long as we’re able to say we create employment opportunities within these 
communities, the people working within CCS will be from these 
communities. The second you start having country manager or someone 
running things with a masters, you begin to withdraw from these 
communities.7 
 
For some individuals, CCS had provided either a stepping-stone to other forms of work or 
education, or a legitimizing channel towards attaining symbolic markers of adulthood. For 
example, for Mambo, CCS was the first job he had not wanted to quit after four months. It 
was a vehicle with which he was able to mentor and motivate troubled youth along with 
football, offering alternatives to criminal activity. In December 2011, savings from years of 
CCS work helped him finally afford a proper dowry and wedding celebration to make official 
his union with his long-time partner and mother of his three children. These were meaningful 
but intangible effects, detectable through ethnographic study but difficult to measure and 
communicate in “return on investment” terms, as the next section illustrates. 
 
4.2. Socially meaningful, commercially insignificant 
At the community level, by 2009 CCS was “becoming a movement. The name speaks for 
itself”.8 CCS clients and non-clients alike referred to the “professionalism” of MCTs and the 
use of the Company’s “world class” products. Visual and olphatic references to the “sweet 
smelling” product or “whiteness of the bowl”, driven by personal and social pride, stood out 
above any health benefits. Despite income and infrastructural poverty in Mathare, residents 
valued having a toilet facility that they, their families and their guests could use without 
discomfort or shame. CCS was the only community-based business to provide and enforce the 
use of uniforms, protective gear, and cleaning techniques subject to “quality control” follow-
ups.  
 
Recent anthropological studies have provided key insights related to the retail distribution of 
products in low-income markets, and the political economy of such products (Burke 1996; 
Cross and Street 2009; Dolan and Rajak 2011). CCS did not resemble most mainstream 
                                                
7 Personal communication with CCS Manager, Nairobi, June 2010. 
8 Observational notes, community walkabout with CCS entrepreneur, March 2010. 
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corporate approaches seeking explicitly or implicitly to shape and meet “common sense” 
hygienic demands. In contrast to other BoP businesses, CCS did not distribute “sachets” of 
cleaning product to local small-scale retail outlets, to be sold to individual customers for 
private in home use, but instead trained Taka Ni Pato ‘hustlers’ to operate as entrepreneurial 
channels of product sale through a service model, targeting a “public good”. Targeting public 
toilets was precisely what had enabled the impetus of CCS at first, but what also entangled 
business practices with the contested attitudes towards the shared commons, and towards the 
agencies of residential “end-users”. The issue was not convincing people that CCS offered a 
valuable service, but instead convincing them that the service’s cost of was worth the price, 
and this was not merely a matter of “better marketing” but rather of understanding the norms 
and codes of the local economy in relation to sanitation. 
 
Within the informal waste economy, residents were end-users of sanitation and waste 
services, but exercised their agencies in different ways. In certain cases, the “end-user” was a 
citizen recipient of the right to better sanitation. In other cases the end-user was an agent of 
improvement. In all cases, the end-user became a “consumer-client” of a particular service. In 
merging the roles of citizen and client, community member and customer, sanitation was both 
subject to consensus building (when it came to maintenance, management and payment) 
while remaining a private matter of consumer choice and personal hygiene. In this regard, 
CCS faced the following paradox.  
 
In Mathare, the commercialisation of public health and basic services (e.g. water vendors, 
waste collection) had already happened, given the absence of municipal service provisioning. 
Therefore CCS was actually building on existing modes of grassroots basic service 
privatization. In these hustle economies, you could not get anything done if you didn’t “do it 
yourself” or pay some enterprising person to do it for you. Mathare hustlers at community 
levels have long been private providers—albeit small scale—offering services in the absence 
of municipal provisions of proper waste and sanitation management. Yet, given that CCS’s 
model depended on private interest and capital engaging with the delivery and management 
of “public” services and goods, turning residents with very little disposable income into 
paying customers of the most basic bodily practice was not as obvious as anticipated. 
 
CCS’s offering inevitably shaped new geographies of “difference and subjectivity” (Burke 
1996) as certain residents became “regular customers” of the cleaning service, while others 
did not; as certain ‘hustlers’ of waste work were refashioned into uniform wearing “sanitation 
entrepreneurs” representing a “professionalised” company name, while other peer groups 
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involved in similar waste work remained isolated from external support. These cleavages 
within slum neighbourhoods where CCS had a presence reflected the inevitable geographies 
of exclusion that occur through monetized economies and fee-paying services, no matter how 
“socially responsible” the business model may be in theory. The fact is, CCS became 
embedded in existing structures of difference and uneven access to a clean toilet. Most 
‘customers’ were residents living in semi-private shanti-compounds or a 4 to 8 storey 
tenement walk-up. The “cleaning contract” had been informally established with the 
landlords, who had consistently neglected the state of these poorly managed shared toilets (in 
the poorest pockets of Mathare they even refused to build a toilet for their tenants). The other 
public toilets serviced by CCS had always been pay-per-use toilets accessible by surrounding 
households, local businesses, schools, and pedestrians. CCS had either been given a license to 
clean these ill-maintained “public goods” by local politicians or had sufficient social capital 
and “muscle” to rehabilitate the toilet themselves. Moreover, improvement schemes could not 
just create a supply, be it of upgraded housing with self-contained toilets, rehabilitated toilets, 
new toilet construction, or more ‘education’ campaigns regarding health and hygiene. They 
could only create change if matched by grassroots efforts to build demand. Part of creating 
the demand was to normalize the monetization of cleaning shared facilities and human waste 
disposal through justifications attesting to environmental and public health claims. But these 
normative values were often rendered irrelevant in the face of adverse infrastructural 
conditions, to the extent that abstract notions of “social good” or “public health” were less 
convincing claims than economic value. If it cost more to be healthy and safe without some 
immediate benefit (e.g. mobile phones cost money but the value is clear and the return on 
investment immediate), behaviour change was unlikely in slum economies.  
According to triangulated interviews conducted with residents and local clinicians, the cost of 
treating a case of diarrhoea was equivalent or higher than the average day’s wage of a slum 
resident, and a third of one household’s monthly rent. But while appending a social and health 
message to a commercial sale might seem like a logical and commendable social enterprise 
strategy, asking waste workers to serve both as marketers and community public health 
officers, showing the health value and potential healthcare savings of a clean toilet, was quite 
another hurdle in practice. As a result, securing “repeat customers” was limited because the 
full value was difficult to transmit and perceive in neighbourhoods unfamiliar with any kind 
of door-to-door service, and with MCTs who were not used to selling a new idea. How do 
you show a frugal and sceptical customer the value of disease prevention in the context and 
time-frame of a door-to-door exchange? These practical challenges reflected the faulty 
assumptions around meeting public health ends through commercial means: the classic trap 
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where a health need (as proven by science) does not necessarily transfer into market demand 
or consumer behaviour (as proven in the market).  
 
One poignant example: In March 2010, after noticing the dip in sales for his area reported at 
the CCS weekly meeting, I spoke with Mzee Kijana to ask him about “business last month”. 
He explained that in February the children were on holiday from school. During holidays, 
regular customers told him not to come, because the children “will make the toilets dirty”. In 
other words, when the children were around, it was not worth paying for a cleaning service 
because too quickly the value of the cleaning job was undone. But the other pragmatic reason 
was the financial strain on all parents around February of each year, when school fees were 
due and household budgets were already “stretched” following the recent Christmas holiday 
travel expenses ”up-country”. This illustrated residents’ pragmatism concerning the cost of 
clean toilets, especially related to children. Children were rarely given a 5 KSH coin to use 
the community public toilets either, and instead forced to defecate out in the open spaces near 
the rubbish heaps or near the river. In schools, those who cleaned toilets were children who 
had “misbehaved”, so it was stigmatized as a degrading task associated with punishment and 
public shame. Plus, few schools provided water or soap for hand-washing, and while hand-
washing before meals was part of Kenyan cultural norms across income levels, cost of water 
and soap impeded many residents from doing so.  
 
Given the challenges of building market demand in the face of survivalist pragmatism, CCS 
Central’s financial performance consistently lagged behind break-even targets and by 2012, 
could no longer justify further business investment. Paradoxically, MCTs were profitable 
with revenues from clients covering their operating costs, included earnings well above 
minimum wage for each team member, and delivered profit for re-investment or 
disbursement. Yet, costs of training, follow-up and quality assurance were well above 
projections, far outpacing the revenue generated through sales of product to the MCTs, 
impeding profitability for the Company. The dilemma was that these processes were a key 
driver of the “buzz,” crucial to relationship building and establishing high quality standards, 
and the business could not grow without it. And yet, creating more demand through sanitation 
marketing efforts and public health educational campaigns aiming to shift residential 
expectations of cleanliness and change individual hygienic habits would still not solve the 
structural business problem. The uncomfortable truth revealed only later was that more 
demand from the residential customers would mean more cost to the business. So, despite 
dual positive impact on customers and cleaners, the business was not covering its operating 
costs and could not be considered a viable investment from the Company’s point of view. 
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“Increased demand” could add new entrepreneurs, new teams, and new streams of income for 
youth in the waste sector, but in relation to the business and the Company’s investment in 
CCS, cost scaled with revenue.  
 
In February 2012, seven years after its inception, CCS received its last instalment of funding 
from the Company. A year later, a CCS staff member sent me a message to say, “Today's 
meeting was to close CCS officially.” One of the first CCS entrepreneurs followed soon after 
with,  
 
It is indeed true and sad, I still cannot believe it, six years of doing something you 
like and believe in, only to have it suddenly crumble, times are hard and what we 
have worked for so many years to build to fade so abruptly is hard to bear, 
anyway it’s still encouraging to see teams still working, this means at least we did 
something right to inspire them.  
 
The exact details of what “closed down” CCS a year after the Company’s funding ended, are 
still unclear and each have their side of the story. CCS Central funds ran out, and while the 
CCS governance structure fostered a unique support system for micro-franchisees and staff, it 
had in parallel cultivated an inefficient and opaque accounting arm. In the meantime, since 
February 2013 a relatively peaceful presidential election came and went, and according to my 
local contacts, CCS teams in various pockets of Nairobi’s informal settlements are apparently 
“still active”. There is still enough “product” in stock to last at least another year. Some have 
decided to start their own cleaning businesses in their local area, while others keep working 
with their portfolio, including cleaning toilets. The CCS uniforms will get tattered and the 
Company logo might fade, but the ‘hustle’ goes on, in one shape or another, even without the 
“good company” or CCS Central.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
The CCS story reflects the spectrum of BoP claims and counter-claims. A business professor 
learning of CCS’s spin-off into a non-profit social enterprise would consider CCS a “business 
failure” and “a great shame”.9 A staunch critic of enterprise-led approaches to basic service 
provision would regard CCS as an example of the neoliberalising post-colonial city for three 
reasons: one, reaching into slums to turn survivalist poor into urban consumers, two, diverting 
resources away from focusing on improving public sanitation infrastructure towards 
                                                
9 Q/A following presentation delivered to faculty of Business and Poverty Chair, Haute Ecole de 
Commerce (HEC), Paris, March 2012.  
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privatising cleaning services of decaying sanitation “hardware”; three, encouraging 
“informalisation from below” (Chant 2009) a form of disguised employment to carve out new 
distribution channels for corporate products in markets where purchases of single units are 
unaffordable. A Corporate Sustainability practitioner might regard CCS as an example of 
“good corporate citizenship,” harnessing business to promote job creation and improve 
hygiene, but might conversely be dismissive of CCS’ inability to scale and meet corporate 
parameters of commercial viability, despite stable economic viability for “entrepreneurs” and 
value to regular customers. CCS had received an unusual degree of patience from its 
corporate partner, capital and otherwise, but could not be justified as commercially viable 
beyond a certain point by the Company. And yet, in my study, Company informants who 
were close to and sympathetic to CCS as a BoP investment frequently referred to CCS as 
“business innovation”, a kind of important though complicated experiment that deserved 
attention, where “course correcting” and “failures” would become valuable learnings in the 
institutional memory for those pursuing the next BoP project elsewhere. If one adopted the 
view that the BoP thesis is a mere “mirage” occulting the more pressing imperative of 
increasing employment in order to address poverty (Karnani 2007), CCS’ focus on youth job 
creation would be applauded, but the commodification and marketing of basic services would 
be criticised, as would CCS’s business model for its cash outflow from the slum community. 
And finally, other ethnographers of corporate interventions might criticise CCS for appending 
a public health message to its market offering (Cross and Street 2009), pointing to CCS’ 
legitimizing discourse (Welker 2009) associating a cleaning service with a “social good,” 
purporting to improve lives (incomes and hygiene) by “repurposing” local informal waste 
workers into “entrepreneurial subjects” (Dolan & Johnstone Louis 2011), while seeking a 
new source of revenue for the Company.  
Each of these interpretations offers important broader critiques of increasingly popular 
market-based development schemes including sanitation entrepreneurship. But neither as 
individual assessments nor as a composite critique do they relay the intangible meaningful 
effects of a social enterprise that engaged waste ‘hustlers’ as sanitation ‘entrepreneurs’. CCS 
had adapted to the hustle economy, but as a corporate-led initiative, it could not survive as a 
flawed commercial proposition, unable to guarantee a return on investment or sustained 
growth. But what remained of CCS was a ‘ghetto’-based appropriation of the service locally 
valued for the “sweet smelling product,” and the “professionalism” of the cleaners. While 
mainstream business and even development metrics of impact would deem CCS a failure, the 
lasting effects of this corporate-community entanglement merit an alternative interpretation.  
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This article seeks to disrupt corporate-community binaries that stress what corporations do to 
local communities, depicting corporate agencies as elite classes who exploit, ignore, or 
extract from the poor. Instead, this article examines the relational dynamics of corporate-led 
project situated within local urban economies, and theorises how corporate presence (and 
absence) was shaped, interpreted, reproduced, and contested by the everyday lived 
experiences of those who managed, worked with, and wore uniforms representing a 
multinational brand. Thus, the focus has been on what the CCS project regimes did rather 
than dwell on the polarizing debates considering whether they were a “good thing” or “bad 
thing”, a “success” or a “failure” (Ferguson 1994; Dolan and Rajak 2011). Just as “narrow 
conceptualizations and assessments of income poverty” (Gill 2010, 240) are insufficient to 
capture levels of “deprivation,” narrow conceptualizations of “improved incomes” (or other 
“impact” measures) are equally insufficient in relaying the vicissitudes of the hustle economy. 
At the nexus of environmental “bads” (Beck 1992) and business opportunity lie shifting 
conceptions and experiences of well-being, revealing how personal gains can come at a cost, 
and how income poverty is cyclical, relative, and contingent on dynamic social relations that 
affect senses of belonging, advancement, and aspirations.  
 
During the years of its corporate-community encounter, CCS had elicited the interest of 
diverse actors including different sanitation professionals, local politicians, NGOs focused on 
youth entrepreneurship, community development activists, and youth groups alike. CCS had 
brought in particular assets familiar to professional businesses outside the slums (uniforms, 
equipment, product), but acquired ghettoized street credibility, codes and sensibilities, and 
most of all respected and retained its youth members, thereby sustaining youth enthusiasm 
and engagement. This was something other youth programmes struggled with in a period 
where the economic imperative of addressing youth poverty through “putting youth to work” 
had become integral to discourses of peace-building and social stability following the 2008 
post-election violence. CCS was one of the only organizations that managed to motivate, 
train, and bring otherwise fragmented youth together for both local economic and social 
development ends. Informal conversations with NGO directors in Nairobi revealed the 
difficulty of managing youth groups and the challenges of rapid turnover of youth participants 
in youth programmes (Makau 2011).  In this, harnessing the entrepreneurial and opportunistic 
qualities of urban youth, by offering tangible access to “on the job” skills training and the 
intangible benefits of increased self-esteem, belonging, collective identity and respect from 
peers and formerly sceptical community members, seems important to acknowledge and 
perhaps even to replicate. 
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In conclusion, CCS was perceived as one or all of the following: a grassroots business 
focused on improved sanitation, a social network of youth groups, a youth-led organization, a 
mentorship model for youth teetering between crime and entrepreneurship, a training 
program, a corporate social responsibility project, a social movement, and lately a non-profit 
social enterprise. It had done more than provide a new source of product distribution in the 
untapped markets of urban slums. It tapped into the subjectivities of self-proclaimed 
‘hustling’ youth and residential customers both living “hand-to-mouth”, adding to the 
grassroots, underground economies that combined elements of capitalist logic—market-based 
approaches to ‘public’ services, lack of formal state presence, and acknowledgement of 
“healthy competition”—with logics of solidarity and “self-help,” paradoxically coupled with 
peer pressure to keep struggling. It was this “mtaa way” in which CCS had successfully 
embedded itself over the years, but also what eventually emphasized the fundamentally 
different parameters, aspirations and expectations of urban youth operating within the hustle 
economy and a Company ultimately bound by its bottom line.   
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